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introduCtion
Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd 2 is a recent Hong Kong case 
from the Court of Appeals (“C.A.”) concerning the enforcement of 
Mainland Chinese awards in Hong Kong under the public policy excep-
tion. This case involved the use of an arbitration-mediation procedure, 
which the respondents contended should have been grounds for refus-
ing enforcement under the public policy exception in the Arrangement 
Concerning the Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards between 
the Mainland and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“The 
Arrangement”).3 In Hong Kong, the public policy exception is an oner-
1  Juris Doctor Candidate 2014, American University-Washington College of Law
2  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627 (C.A.).
3  See id; Arrangement Concerning the Mutual Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
Between the Mainland and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, P.R.C.-
H.K.S.A.R., Jun. 21, 1999.
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ous standard of proof; Gao Haiyan illustrates the need for a cultural 
understanding of the place of arbitration when considering grounds for 
refusing enforcement in Hong Kong.4 In addition to narrowly constru-
ing the exception, Hong Kong courts consider cultural aspects of the 
situs of arbitration, thus further constraining the use of this exception.5
A mere violation of the enforcing jurisdiction’s arbitration regula-
tions will not give rise to the exception; rather enforcement “must 
violate the most basic notions of morality and justice.”6 Gao Haiyan 
introduced a cultural sliding scale to this analysis by reinforcing the 
preclusion of apparent bias as grounds for refusing enforcement under 
the public policy exception. Hong Kong’s political and cultural position 
makes this decision both desirable and necessary. But, for foreign busi-
nesses operating in China, it may reduce the chances of a favorable out-
come in an enforcement action. Accordingly, these parties should take 
advantage of the local rules and laws of both Hong Kong and Mainland 
China in carefully drafting arbitration agreements to nullify these risks
As China’s prominence in the global economy grows, arbitration 
proceedings concerning commercial disputes in China are becoming 
more common. Enforcement of these Mainland awards is frequently 
sought in Hong Kong.7 However, many parties seek to resist enforce-
ment based on public policy grounds.8 Thus, practitioners must be 
aware of Hong Kong’s political and cultural realities when seeking to 
4  See id. at 659 (stating that while a mediation may have been conducted differently 
in Hong Kong, it is important to consider how mediation is normally conducted in the 
place it is conducted). 
5  E.g., Hebei Import and Export Corp. v. Polytek Eng. Co., [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 
665 (C.F.A.).
6  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 646 (C.A.).
7  See, e.g., Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. v. Eton Properties Ltd., [2009] 4 
H.K.L.R.D. 353 (C.A.) (granting enforcement of a CIETAC award);China Nanhai 
Oil kkJoint Service Corporation Shenzen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co., [1995] 2 
H.K.L.R.D. 215 (H.C.) (granting enforcement of a CIETAC award); Shandong Textiles 
Import and Export Corp. v. Da Hua Non-Ferrous Metals Co., [2002] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 844 
(C.F.I.) (granting enforcement of a CIETAC award). 
8  E.g., Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 359, 361 (holding that 
impossibility cannot be a public policy ground when the impossibility of performance 
is self inflicted); Paklito Investment Ltd. v. Klockner East Asia Ltd, [1993] 2 H.K.L.R 
39, 49 (H.C.) (holding the public policy exception will not be considered when failure 
to present a case is sufficient); A v. R, [2009] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 389, 397 (C.F.I.) (holding 
that the liquidated damages argument was not contrary to public policy because it was 
not raised before the tribunal).
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resist Mainland awards on public policy grounds.9 Practitioners must 
particularly consider the differences between the judicial systems of 
Hong Kong and the Mainland.10
Hong Kong’s legal code varies from that of Mainland China. While 
Hong Kong is not a separate country from the People’s Republic of 
China (“PRC”), it constitutes a Special Administrative Region (“SAR”). 
Accordingly, the Arrangement, rather than the New York Convention 
(“the Convention”), governs the enforcement of such awards. However, 
both the Arrangement and the Convention contain similar provisions 
allowing enforcing jurisdictions to refuse enforcement based on public 
policy.11
The Chinese court system is a unitary system with four levels of 
courts.12 The final court is the Supreme People’s Court; below it are the 
high courts at the provincial level, the intermediate courts at the prefec-
ture and the major municipality levels, and, the lowest courts, the basic 
people’s courts at the county level.13 For the purposes of international 
arbitration, the intermediate courts are the most important because the 
9  Hong Kong was part of China until 1857, when it was handed over to the United 
Kingdom for 150 years. Consequently, Hong Kong developed a common law system 
based on the English tradition, importing important concepts and considerations 
from that system. It is to be expected that this would create some tension after 1997, 
when the United Kingdom handed Hong Kong back over to the Mainland. The “One 
Country, Two Systems” paradigm emerged as a solution to ease this transition.
10  Id. 
11  The New York Convention provides that “enforcement may be refused . . . [when] 
. . . [t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public 
policy of that country.” Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, art. 5, opened for signature Jun. 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. The 
Arrangement provides that “[t]he enforcement of [an] award may be refused if the 
court of the Mainland holds that the enforcement of the arbitral award in the Mainland 
would be contrary to the public interests of the Mainland, or if the court of the HKSAR 
decides that the enforcement of the arbitral award in Hong Kong would be contrary to 
the public policy of the HKSAR.” Arrangement Concerning the Mutual Enforcement 
of Arbitral Awards Between the Mainland and Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, P.R.C.-H.K.S.A.R., Jun. 21, 1999 (hereinafter the Arrangement).
12  zhou Jian, Judicial Intervention in International Arbitration: A Comparative 
Study of the Scope of the New York Convention in U.S. and Chinese Courts, 15 paC. 
Rim & pOl’Y J. 403, 407 (2006).
13  Id.
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confirmation of awards is sought in those courts.14 Moreover, these 
courts maintain original jurisdiction for any disputes that involve sig-
nificant foreign elements.15 In contrast, Hong Kong has a common law 
system. Its hierarchal structure is similar to that of other common law 
jurisdictions. At the top is the Court of Final Appeal (“C.F.A.”), then the 
High Court, and below that the district courts. The High Court includes 
both the Court of First Instance (“C.F.I.”) and the Court of Appeals 
(“C.A.”).
The case involved a mediation-arbitration (“med-arb”) procedure. 
In contrast to an arbitration proceeding, med-arb is a process by which 
a mediator is appointed to resolve the dispute before an arbitration pro-
ceeding is commenced.16 The Hong Kong legislature has codified the 
use of these procedures, whereas Western institutions regard med-arb 
procedures with suspicion.17 The exposure of confidential information 
is a major concern in med-arb procedures. An arbitrator, acting as a 
mediator, may become exposed in unilateral communications to confi-
dential information not available to the other side, or otherwise become 
sympathetic to another party.18 It is questionable as to whether any 
arbitrator can neutralize that risk, and, as a consequence, many arbitra-
tors will refuse to mediate.19 Further complicating this process, many of 
these mediation clauses have serious drafting issues.20
Nevertheless, mediation has a celebrated history in Chinese culture, 
which is reflected by the extensive use of mediation in both civil judicial 
14  zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhongcaifa ( ) [The 
Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Jan. 01, 1995) art. 58.
15  Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., April 9, 1991) art 19.
16  Kun Fan, The New Arbitration Ordinance in Hong Kong, Journal of Int’l Arb, 
715, 718 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2012 Volume 29 Issue 6).
17  Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, Cap. 609, (2011) §§ 32–33.
18  Carlos de Vera, Arbitrating Harmony: “Med Arb” and the Confluence of Culture 
and the Rule of Law in the Resolution of International Commercial Disputes in China, 
Colum. J. asian l. 150, 156–58 (2004).
19  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd, [2011] H.K.E.C. 514. ¶ 77 (C.F.I.) 
(overturned) by Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627 
(C.A.).
20  Hyundai Eng. & Const. Co. v. Vigour Ltd., [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 723, 734 (C.A.) 
(holding a mediation and conciliation contractual clause unenforceable because it 
amounted to an agreement to agree without specified timetables).
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proceedings and arbitration. Mediation is rooted in Confucian values.21 
During China’s dynastical phase, the concepts of li and fa competed for 
dominance in China.22 The li concept gained favor, and under traditional 
Chinese law, the courts expected Chinese society to take care of civil 
disputes—characterized as “minor matters”—by itself.23 This notion 
gave rise to the need for mediators in villages. The Chinese thus have 
a strong inclination to mediate rather than to litigate, as litigation is 
deemed as a breach of social harmony.24 Additionally, the advantages 
of mediation in China are numerous. Guanxi, or one’s relations with 
other people, is a central concept in Chinese culture. It is favorable to 
preserve positive relations with others whenever possible. Mediation 
can allow parties to save “face”, essentially their reputation before the 
community, and it allows for the preservation of business relationships 
by minimizing conflict in the dispute resolution process.25
Previously, mediation was an extrajudicial process, however it 
became court-sponsored and tied to the legal system during Mao 
zedong’s reign. Court-sponsored mediation rose to importance, par-
ticularly in the context of divorces.26 Mao’s China was quick to draw a 
contrast between what was regarded as a corrupt moral structure in the 
West and Chinese values.27 An interventionist approach was taken on 
divorce, using mediation as a process to preserve marriages.28 This use 
of court sponsored mediation consequently shaped the whole judicial 
system.29
Today, China boasts a network of professional mediators with more 
than 6,800,000 members.30 While mediation is more common in the 
21 E.g., Benjamin L. Read, Mediating the Mediation Debate: Conflict Resolution 
and the Local State in China, 152 J. COnFliCT ResOl., 725, 740 (2008).
22  Li represented the Confucian values of social harmony, and encouraged disputes 
to be resolved amicably. In contrast, the more formalistic fa approach was embodied 
in legalism, which advanced that the state should have a predominant role in life. Vera, 
supra note 17 at 166–67. Vera, supra note 17 at 162, 166–67.
23  Jeiren Hu, Grand Mediation in China, 51 Asian Surv., 1065 (2006).
24  Phillip C. Huang, Court Mediation in China, Past and Present, 32 Modern China, 
275, 279 (2006)
25  Vera, supra note 17, at 166–67.
26  Huang, supra note 23, at 287.
27  Id.
28  Id.
29  Id.
30  Read, supra note 20, at 738.
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countryside, it is also pervasive throughout the court system.31 One 
study found that a high proportion of Chinese trial judges regard them-
selves as interventionists and will engage in mediation proceedings.32 In 
many proceedings, an initial attempt at mediation is required before the 
dispute will move forward.33 Judges conduct many of these mediations 
in a context similar to med-arb.34 Similar to judges in court proceedings, 
Chinese arbitrators often switch hats and become mediators, and then 
go back to the role of arbitrator, sometimes on the presumption that 
mediation is desired by the parties to preserve their relationship.35 In 
fact, med-arb is a traditional method used at the China International 
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (“CIETAC”), the only 
arbitral commission authorized to deal with foreign-related disputes.36
Hong Kong courts strongly value finality to litigation and comity. 
This valuation is even more important in the case of the Mainland, given 
the two jurisdictions’ common cultural history and political connec-
tions. This article will examine how several Hong Kong legal doctrines 
allow it to reinforce those policy considerations. When resisting the 
enforcement of a Mainland award based on public policy, the doctrines 
of waiver and estoppel coupled with notions of fundamental justice 
and morality are critical considerations for any party. Gao Haiyan has 
made it clear that with regards to med-arb, a common procedure in the 
Mainland, concepts such as the role of counsel and the appropriateness 
of a med-arb procedure will be judged on a sliding cultural scale. The 
sliding scale is only subordinated by instances of fraud, corruption, or 
other universal public policies that would be fatal to an award.
I. Prior and Current Law
A. The Substantive Law & The Arrangement
Both the Arrangement and the Convention contain similar provi-
sions allowing enforcement jurisdictions to refuse enforcement based 
31  Id. at 739.
32  Huang, supra note 23, at 303.
33  Vera, supra note 17, at 173.
34  Id. at 181.
35  Id. at 185.
36  Lu Song, The New CIETAC Arbitration Rules of 2012, 29 J. inT’l aRb, 299, 309 
(2012). 
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on public policy.37 It provides that enforcement may be refused in the 
Mainland if its enforcement would be contrary to the “public interests 
of the Mainland” and, likewise, enforcement may be refused in Hong 
Kong based on “public policy.”38
The arbitration of the principal case was conducted in China in 
accordance with the PRC’s Arbitration Law (“the Law”). The Law 
provides for the establishment of arbitration commissions throughout 
the provinces, which must be registered with the judicial department 
or municipalities directly under the Central Government.39 The Law 
additionally provides that an arbitrator must withdraw from a case when 
that person “meets a party or his agent in private, accepts an invitation 
for dinner by a party or his representative or accepts gifts presented by 
any of them,”40 or where the arbitrator has a relationship that may affect 
impartiality.41 Article 35 provides that a party may submit a complaint 
for the withdrawal of an arbitrator after the first hearing only if reasons 
for the withdrawal become known after the start of the first hearing.42 
The law further provides for a med-arb procedure if the parties consent 
voluntarily.43 The award may be set aside if the composition of the tribu-
nal or the procedure is contrary to law,44 or if the award is contrary to the 
social and public interests.45
37  The New York Convention provides that “enforcement may be refused . . . [when] . 
. . [t]he recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy 
of that country.” Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, art. 5, opened for signature Jun. 10, 1958 330 U.N.T.S. 3. The Arrangement 
that “[t]he enforcement of [an] award may be refused if the court of the Mainland 
holds that the enforcement of the arbitral award in the Mainland would be contrary 
to the public interests of the Mainland, or if the court of the HKSAR decides that the 
enforcement of the arbitral award in Hong Kong would be contrary to the public policy 
of the HKSAR.” The Arrangement, P.R.C.-H.K.S.A.R., Jun. 21, 1999 (hereinafter the 
Arrangement).
38  The Arrangement, P.R.C.-H.K.S.A.R., Jun. 21, 1999, art. 7.
39  The Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Jan. 01, 2000) art. 10.
40  Id. at art. 34 (4).
41  Id. at art. 34 (3).
42  Id. at art. 35.
43  Id. at art. 51.
44  The Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Jan. 01, 2000) 
art.58(3).
45  Id. at art. 58(6).
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In Hong Kong, according to the Arbitration Ordinance, the enforce-
ment of an award may be refused when a party is unable to present their 
case,46 or it would be contrary to public policy to enforce the award.47 
Both Convention and awards under the Arrangement may be refused 
enforcement on identical grounds.48 49
PRC contract law governed the underlying contract, which gave 
rise to the dispute in Gao Haiyan.50 Under PRC law, contracts that “are 
manifestly unfair at the time the contract was concluded” or “concluded 
by one party against the other party’s true intention through the use of 
fraud, coercion, or exploitation of the other party’s precarious position” 
will allow the injured party “to request the people’s court or an arbitra-
tion institution to modify or revoke it.”51
B.  The Public Policy Exception in Hong Kong
The public policy exception is drawn narrowly in Hong Kong, and 
can only be relied upon when “enforcement would be contrary to fun-
damental conceptions of morality and justice.”52 The enforcement of an 
award obtained by fraud is one example of such a narrow standard.53 In 
Hong Kong, when relying on the public policy exception as a defense, it 
is important to raise it early, preferably during the arbitration. Where an 
aspect of a public policy defense is not be available in another jurisdic-
tion, Hong Kong courts will not apply the doctrine of estoppel to that 
particular defense. The issues of waiver and estoppel are often present.
1. Hebei Import and Export Corp v. Polytek Engineering
The seminal case in Hong Kong for the enforcement of Mainland 
awards on public policy grounds is Hebei Import and Export Corp v. 
Polytek Engineering Co., which addresses waiver in a case of not raising 
46  Arbitration Ordinance, (2011) Cap. 609 § 86(c)(ii).
47  Id. at § 86(2)(b).
48  Id. at §§ 89(2)(c)(ii), (3)(b).
49 Id. at §§ 95(2)(c)(ii), (3)(b).
50  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 632 (C.A.).
51  Id. at 635.
52  Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perushan Pertanbangan Minyak Dan Gas Bam Negara, 
[2009] H.K.C.F.A.R. 84, 100 (C.F.A.) (holding that fraud is contrary to Hong Kong’s 
fundamental notions of morality and justice). See also, J.J. Agro Indus. Ltd. v. Texuna 
Int’l Ltd., [1994] 1 H.K.L.R. 89, 93 (H.C.) (holding the kidnapping of a witness 
amounts to fraud under the public policy exception).
53  Karaha Bodas Co. H.K.C.F.A.R. at 100.
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a defense before the Intermediate Courts of the PRC.54 The applicants 
of this case sought to enforce a CIETAC award in Hong Kong, and the 
respondents relied on public policy exception to resist enforcement.55 
There, a chief arbitrator was present during the assessment of goods 
with only the experts and in the absence of the sellers of the goods or 
the other arbitrators.56 This defense was not raised in the arbitral pro-
ceedings nor at the Beijing Intermediate Court.
Ultimately, the court enforced the award. Speaking on behalf of 
majority, Sir Anthony Mason identified four issues: first, whether the 
respondents waived the defense by failing to raise it in the Beijing 
Intermediate Court; second, whether the respondents could now resist 
enforcement of the award because of the Chief Arbitrator’s communica-
tions; third, whether the Respondents were unable to present their case; 
and finally, whether public policy was violated.57The court stressed that 
comity and finality, subject to certain conditions, are critical policy con-
siderations in Hong Kong.58 Regarding the issue of waiver, the court 
noted that a failure to raise a public policy issue in a proceeding to set 
aside an award in the supervisory jurisdiction does necessarily constitute 
waiver.59 The court held that different jurisdictions have different public 
policy interpretations and often public policy grounds are unavailable in 
the supervising jurisdiction, so they may be raised in the enforcement 
54  Heibei Import and Export Corp. v Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 665 
(C.F.A.).
55  Id. at 669.
56  The seller was not able to examine the experts at the time of the meeting. However, 
the sellers had the opportunity to challenge the experts’ opinions, and had ample time 
later to present its case. Id.
57  Id. at 686.
58  Id. at 688. See also Shantou Zeng Ping Xu Yueli Shu Kuao Trading Co. v. Wesco 
Polymers Ltd, [2002] H.K.E.C. 76, ¶ 17(invoking comity as a consideration for the 
enforcement of an award attacked on the illegality of the underlying contract, which 
had been found valid by the Beijing Intermediate Court); Qinghuangdao Tongda 
Ent. Dev. Corp. v. Millan Basic Co., [1993] 1 H.K.L.R. 173, 176 (H.C.) (holding that 
finality is an important public policy consideration in Hong Kong, and courts will not 
reexamine disputes of fact).
59  Heibei Import and Export Corp. v Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 665, 
688 (C.F.A.).
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jurisdiction.60 However, as in Hebei Import and Export Co., Hong Kong 
courts will not tolerate parties keeping procedural defects “up the 
sleeve” as to frustrate later enforcement actions.61
In his concurring opinion, Presiding Judge Litton noted that the 
public policy exception is narrow, and the standards in an international 
arbitration should exceed those for setting aside domestic awards.62 
He also noted that while Hong Kong courts will not overlook cases of 
actual bias, mere apparent bias is insufficient to trigger the public policy 
exception. If the proceedings were conducted in such a manner that the 
respondents were unable to present their case, then it would be unneces-
sary to rely on the public policy ground primarily because a separate 
basis exists for resisting enforcement.63 This is a preferable ground for 
refusing enforcement because of the desire to construe the public policy 
exception as narrowly as possible.
2. Waiver & Estoppel
Another example of a case where waiver played a role in the 
outcome is Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. v. Eton Properties Ltd.64 
In Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd., the applicants sought to enforce a 
CIETAC award which granted the specific performance of a contract.65 
The respondents relied on both impossibility and public policy argu-
60  See id. See also Shanghai City Foundation Works Corp. v. Sunlink Ltd, [2001] 
H.C.C.T. No. 83 of 200 (C.F.I.) (holding it is unusual to refuse enforcement on public 
policy grounds when the supervising jurisdiction has upheld the award because it 
leads to unusual injustice as the winning party may not seek a new arbitration in the 
supervising jurisdiction).
61  Hebei Import and Export Corp., H.K.L.R.D at 688. See also A v. R, [2009] 3 
H.K.L.R.D. 389, 397 (C.F.I.) (holding that a failure to raise a point concerning 
liquidated damages, and not participating in the arbitration regarding that issue 
amounted to a waiver); Paklito Investment Ltd v. Klockner Asia Ltd., [1993] 2 H.K.L.R. 
39 (H.C.) (granting enforcement partially because respondents had not taken steps 
to set aside the award in the supervising jurisdiction); Pacific China Holdings Ltd. v. 
Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd., [2007] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 741, ¶ 15 (C.F.I.)(holding a case 
of waiver had been made out where an award was attacked for apparent bias because 
questionable communications between the arbitrators had not been objected to at the 
arbitration).
62  Hebei Import and Export Corp., H.K.L.R.D at 675.
63  Id. at 676.
64  Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. v. Eton Properties Ltd., [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 353, 
356-57 (C.F.A.).
65  Id.
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ments before the C.A.;66 however, they did not raise the issue before 
CIETAC,67 but instead filed an application that they later withdrew with 
the Beijing Intermediate Court.68 The court held that a waiver had been 
made out, as the respondents could have raised the defense at either 
the first or second arbitration in the dispute, and here the impossibility 
claim seemed like it had been self-inflicted.69
Waiver can also play a role in an attack on an arbitrator or a chal-
lenge to the composition of the tribunal. In China Nanhai Oil Joint 
Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co., the defendants 
objected to the default appointment of an arbitrator.70 They raised the 
objection to the Shenzhen sub-commissioner and were overruled.71 
They did not pursue the available avenues of contacting the Chairman 
or Vice Chairman of C.I.E.T.A.C.72 Furthermore, they did not raise the 
issue before the full tribunal, but only brought up the defense with one 
member.73 The court held that good faith considerations are relevant to 
determining whether a party is estopped by the Mainland intermediate 
courts, and had the defendants won, they would not have issued this 
specific complaint.74
3. Bias & Med-Arb
With respect to the issue of bias, Hong Kong courts are reluctant to 
find that technical violations automatically give rise to bias per se. For 
example, in Pacific China Holdings,75 each party nominated an arbitra-
tor, and the arbitrator who was nominated by the applicants contacted 
the applicants’ attorney, their solicitor, unilaterally, thus giving rise 
66  Id. at 359.
67  Id. at 360.
68  Id. 
69  Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd. v. Eton Properties Ltd., [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 353, 
360-61 (C.F.A.).
70  China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch v. Gee Tai Holdings Co., 
[1995] 2 H.K.L.R. 215 (H.C.).
71  Id. at 217.
72  Id.
73  Id.
74  Id.at 225–26.
75  Pacific China Holdings Ltd. v. Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd., [2007] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 
741 (C.F.I. 2007).
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to a question of bias.76 The court held that unilateral communications 
between an arbitrator and a party do not give rise to bias per se.77
With regard to voluntary med-arb proceedings, the relevant con-
tractual clauses must be drafted with care in Hong Kong. In Hyundai 
Engineering and Construction Co. v. Vigour Ltd., an arbitration clause 
included a provision mandating the parties attempt conciliation.78 Upon 
failing to reach an agreement, the contract sent the dispute to a third 
party mediation procedure.79 The contract also included a clause that 
provided “no party shall serve the other.”80 Due to the lack of certainty, 
the negotiation and mediation provisions were unenforceable and were 
merely agreements to agree.81 Moreover, a timetable of the dispute 
resolution process is required.82 This rendered the whole agreement 
unenforceable, opening the door to litigation.83
4. English and Singaporean Jurisprudence
The United Kingdom and Singapore legal systems provide useful 
comparisons. Hong Kong’s legal structure is rooted in the common law 
of the U.K, and Singapore is likewise a common law jurisdiction with 
significant Chinese cultural influence. The seminal case from the U.K. 
is Minimetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel which, like Gao Haiyan, 
concerned a Mainland award.84 However, in Minimetals Germany 
GmbH, the New York Convention governed the enforcement action.85 
The underlying dispute regarded a contract for the sale of steel, and the 
case was brought under an issue concerning the quality and dimensions 
of that steel.86 The arbitral tribunal issued an award for the plaintiffs 
76  Id. at ¶¶ 4-6.
77  Id. at ¶ 5 (holding that the unilateral communications did not give rise to apparent 
bias because the solicitor did not complain about the communications, and that a fair 
minded observer must find the communication as unfair or lack transparency).
78  Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co. v. Vigour Ltd., [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 
723, 726 (C.A.).
79  Id. at 728.
80  Id. a 730.
81  Id. at 732.
82  Id. at 734.
83  Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co. v. Vigour Ltd., [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 
723, 735 (C.A.)..
84  Minimetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel, (1999), C.L.C. 647, 648 (Comm.). 
85  Id. at 656.
86  Id. at 649.
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on a subcontract.87 The defendants applied to the Beijing Intermediate 
Court to revoke the award on grounds that the defendants were unable 
to make a case because they did not have the opportunity to challenge 
the arbitrator’s reliance on a sub-sale award, breaching Article 58 of 
CIETAC rules.88 The Beijing Intermediate Court ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs.89
Enforcement was sought in the United Kingdom. The defendants 
relied on a theory of breach of natural justice, an improper applica-
tion of CIETAC rules, and that enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to public policy.90 In determining whether the defendants had 
been denied the opportunity to present their case, the court held that 
the initial Beijing Court determination for resumed arbitration was to 
allow the defendants to confront the original reliance on the sub-sale 
award.91 Counsel felt that there was no jurisdiction for this decision, 
and therefore did not confront this reliance.92 The court held that a clear 
waiver had been made out.93 Furthermore, the court held that to estab-
lish a defense under the public policy exception, a party must show that 
an award was arrived at by means “contrary to substantial justice”.94 
Relevant to public policy considerations are the availability of local 
remedies and the reasonableness of a party’s omission of using them. 
When considering the enforcement of a Convention award, the court will 
examine the nature of the procedural breach, whether the supervising 
jurisdiction’s local remedies were invoked, whether the remedy sought 
was unavailable under that jurisdiction, whether the supervisory juris-
diction conclusively upheld the award, and, if a party failed to invoke a 
defense, the extent to which that decision was reasonable.95 Under this 
fact pattern, the court found that a substantial breach of justice had not 
been shown.96 These considerations are similar to Hong Kong’s notion 
of requiring a breach of fundamental notions of justice.
87 Id. at 649–50.
88  Id.. at 650.
89  Minimetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel, (1999), C.L.C. 647, 653 (Comm.).
90  Id. at 654.
91  Id. at 657.
92  Id. at 657, 661.
93  Id. at 659.
94  Minimetals Germany GmbH v. Ferco Steel, (1999), C.L.C. 647, 659 (Comm.)
95  Id. at 661.
96  Id. at 662.
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In Singapore, the public policy exception and allegations of proce-
dural defects are similarly disfavored. In Soh Beng Tee v. Fairmound 
Development Ltd., a dispute arose concerning the timely completion of 
a construction project.97 There, the court refused to set aside a domestic 
award, but the court noted that the analysis would be the same as in an 
international arbitration proceeding.98 Singapore’s Arbitration Act pro-
vides that an award may be set aside by the court if there is a breach of 
natural justice which occurs in the making of the award which prejudices 
one of the party’s rights—a ground similar to the public policy excep-
tion.99 To establish such a breach, a party must show which rule was 
breached, how it was breached, in what way the breach was connected 
to the making of the award, and how the breach prejudiced that party’s 
rights. Elaborating on these principles, the court cited several relevant 
factors, including whether arbitrators observed the rules of natural jus-
tice and equal treatment, whether there was a failure for the opportunity 
to present a case, whether there was opportunity to rebut the opponent’s 
argument, whether there was extraneous information in the hearing that 
was considered, and whether the requirement for actual prejudice had 
been met.100 The court emphasized a restrictive view of public policy.101 
The court stressed that one of Singapore’s major public policy concerns 
is an interest in efficiency of the alternate dispute resolution process. The 
arbitrators’ judgment will not necessarily be disturbed, even if it strikes 
a middle path where one party thinks it is wholly in the right.102 This 
establishes a large degree of deference towards the arbitral decision, and 
is directly related to the purpose of the Arbitration Act, finality.103
97  Soh Beng Tee v. Fairmound Development Ltd., [2007] 3 SLR(R) 86, 100.
98  Id. at 102.
99  Id. at 102.
100  Soh Beng Tee [2007] 3 SLR(R) at 113. See also, PT Asurmansi Jasa Indonesia 
(Persero), [2006] S.G.C.A. at 617, 619, 622 (holding that a party had the opportunity 
to present an argument, albeit possibly only informally, therefore enforcing the award 
to promote finality to litigation)(emphasizing a narrow scope to the public policy 
exception to enforcement)
101  Soh Beng Tee [2007] 3 SLR(R) at 116.
102  Id. at 120. Cf. Anwar Siraj v. Ting Kong Chung, [2003] 2 S.L.R. (R) 287, 296 
(holding that challenges to an arbitrator’s bias and competence are evaluated by 
whether the misconduct amounts to a substantial miscarriage of justice, and that this is 
determined under an objective test, dismissing a subjective lack of confidence by one 
of the parties). 
103  Soh Beng Tee [2007] 3 SLR(R) at 130.
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II. Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings
A.  The Underlying Facts
The underlying dispute between the Respondents and Applicants
involved the validity of a Shareholder Transfer Agreement (“Shareholder 
Agreement”) under the law of the PRC.104 The applicants were husband 
and wife, Gao and Xie, who owned stock in a company that was invested 
in a mining venture.105 106 The Respondents were a group of British 
Virgin Island (“BVI”) companies,107 which acquired the applicants’ 
interest in the mining venture through a share transfer agreement.108 The 
governing contract contained an arbitration clause, providing for arbi-
tration at the Xi’An Arbitration Commission (“XAC”) in the PRC.109
The applicants sought to revoke the Shareholder Agreement on 
the PRC legal ground that it was entered into by taking advantage of 
people in a “precarious position.”110 When the Shareholder Agreement 
was concluded, the Applicants had been incarcerated for six months 
and suffered miserable conditions during their detention.111 According 
to the arbitral award, the detainment was due to a management dispute 
between the applicants and the commissioner of the mining venture, 
which led to minor injuries.112 Furthermore, during their detainment, the 
applicants’ family members reached out to Liu Jian Shen, a “person of 
104  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 633 (C.A.). 
105  The name of their company was Baijjun. Id. at 632.
106  Baijun and Angola, a BVI company and a respondent in the case, each owned 
50% in the “zhongxin” venture, which operated a coalmine in Changlebao. Id. at 633.
107  Id.
108  Under The Agreement, the Applicants agreed to transfer all of their shares in 
Baijun to the first Respondent, Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 633. Later, by a 
supplemental agreement, the second Respondent was added as a transferee, such that 
the first Respondent received 62% of the transferred shares and the second received 
38%. Id. Finally, the Respondents transferred shares to Daynew and Far Orient 
Holdings, two other BVI companies. Id.
109  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., 1 [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 633 (C.A.).
110  Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 635.
111  Id. at 633 
112  Id. 
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influence”,113 in order to “save persons”. 114 According to the Applicants, 
this situation led to the Shareholder Agreement. As proof that it was the 
result of improper pressure, the applicants cited the difference between 
the share prices and the actual capital contributed, as the valuations did 
not reflect the value of the mining venture.115 The applicants initiated 
proceedings with the XAC.
As is the case in many CIETAC arbitrations and civil proceed-
ings, a mediation process was interwoven with the proceedings.116 The 
Applicants alleged that there was agreement to mediate, whereas the 
respondents alleged that there was no such agreement, only that they 
had indicated a willingness to mediate.117 However, the Respondents 
did not object to the mediation during the arbitral proceedings.118 The 
tribunal consisted of one arbitrator nominated by the Applicants, one 
by the Respondents, and a Chief Arbitrator.119 While not an arbitrator 
in the case, Pan Jun Xin, the Secretary General of the XAC,, became 
a principal actor in the subsequent aborted mediation.120 zeng Wei, 
a shareholder in Angola, one of the BVI companies, represented the 
respondents at the mediation.121
zhou and Pan were appointed to communicate a 250 million RMB 
settlement offer to the Respondents. Pan sent the suggestion to a lawyer 
for the applicants.122 They then arranged to meet with zeng, as opposed 
to respondents’ counsel.123 They met for dinner at the Xi’an Shangri-la 
Hotel, an informal setting, where Pan and zhou asked zeng to “work 
113  Liu Jian Shen was the president of the Xia Yizhilin Group, and a member of 
the National People’s Congress. He was also the controller of the Kaiyuan Holding 
Company, and was alleged to be a controller of Keyneeye Holdings, Dew Purple, and 
Fair Orient. Id. 
114  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 638 (C.A.). The 
Applicants evidently believed that Liu could secure their release, an assertion disputed 
by the Respondents. Id. at 633.
115  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 636.
116  Id. at 640.
117  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2011] H.K.E.C. 514, ¶ 18 (C.F.I.).
118  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 645 (C.A.).
119  The Applicants nominated zhou Jian as an Arbitrator, and The Respondents 
nominated Liu Chun Tian. The Chief Arbitrator was Jiang Ping. Id. at 636. 
120  Id.
121  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 636.
122  Id.
123  Id.
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on” the respondents with regards to the settlement offer.124 According 
to zeng’s testimony, Pan told zeng the result of the arbitration would 
be a valid contract, but that the Respondents would compensate the 
Applicants 250 million RMB.125 When the Respondents learned of the 
offer, they rejected it. Subsequently, the XAC issued an award invali-
dating the contracts, and recommended that the Applicants pay the 
Respondent’s 50 million RMB, which was a nonbinding provision of 
the award.126
The Respondents then appealed to the Beijing Intermediate Court.127 
At the Intermediate Court, the Respondents advanced a theory that 
the arbitrators had become tainted with bias because of Pan’s influ-
ence, which had not been raised during the arbitral proceedings.128 The 
Intermediate Court held that Pan’s actions were justified under the XAC 
rules, and that the award was otherwise valid.129 The Intermediate Court 
ruled in favor of the Applicants.130 The Applicants sought enforcement 
in Hong Kong, and were granted leave to enforce the judgment.131
B.  The Decisions of the Court of the First Instance (C.F.I.) and 
the Court of Appeals (C.A.)
Judge Reynolds, writing for the C.F.I., set aside the leave to enforce 
the judgment on public policy grounds.132 Vice President of the Court 
of Appeals Tang (“V.P. Tang”), writing for the C.A., overturned.133 The 
primary legal issue before the courts was whether the meeting at the 
Shangri-la Hotel, cast as a mediation, violated the public policy of 
Hong Kong. Both decisions analyzed the issue in the context of waiver, 
124  Id.
125  Id.
126  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 639 (C.A.).
127  Id. at 636, 639.
128  Bias refers to the principle that judges and arbitrators, must not only avoid actual 
bias, but the appearance of bias to protect the integrity of the judicial system. Gao 
Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] H.K.L.R.D 627, 639, 641, 659 (C.A.).
129  The Xi’An Intermediate Court held that the Chief Arbitrator was empowered to 
act as a mediator because Article 37 of the X.A.C. Rules provides “mediation may be 
chaired by the Arbitral Tribunal or the presiding arbitrator. Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D. 
at 640–41.
130  Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 641.
131  Id. at 631.
132  Id. at 632.
133  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D 627, 660 (C.A.).
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estoppel, and the relationship between apparent bias and the public 
policy exception in Hong Kong.134
1. Waiver
The XAC rules state that:
a party shall be deemed to have waived his or her right 
to object where he or she knows or should know that the 
Commission, the arbitral tribunal, the counter party and 
other persons have failed to comply with any provision 
of, or requirements under the Rules, and yet participates 
in or proceeds with the arbitration.135
Applying the lead case Hebei Import and Export Co. v. Polytek 
Engineering Ltd., the C.F.I. found that a case of waiver had not been 
established.136 The waiver theory is primarily concerned with the pos-
sibility of litigants “holding complaints up their sleeve at the arbitration 
in order to deny or delay relief.”137 Judge Reynolds was concerned the 
tribunal may have become prejudiced against the Respondents if they 
had complained.138 The matter was complicated further because under 
XAC rules, Pan would have determined any allegation of bias against 
him.139 The C.F.I. held that one cannot “hold a complaint up their sleeve” 
in a case where complaining to the tribunal is useless or may prejudice 
that party.
The C.A., however, strongly disagreed with this analysis. V.P. Tang, 
wrote that the Respondents had waived the public policy defense because 
they had kept an alleged irregularity up their sleeve for later use.140 The 
fear of prejudicing the tribunal against the Respondents was an insuf-
ficient reason for not complaining, and it effectively barred the tribunal, 
which was better positioned to rule on such a matter, from remedying 
134  Waiver refers to the doctrine that a party to an arbitration should raise 
procedural issues and defenses before the Tribunal, or otherwise forgo the defense 
in later proceedings whereas estoppel refers to the doctrine that once the supervising 
jurisdiction renders a decision, it should be respected by the enforcing jurisdiction 
absent compelling circumstances. Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek Eng’g 
Corp., [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 665, 687 (C.F.I.).
135  Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 645-46. 
136  Gao Haiyan, [2011] H.K.E.C. 514, ¶ 81 (C.F.I.).
137  Id..
138  Id. at ¶ 87. 
139  Id. at ¶¶ 87,88.
140  Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 650.
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the alleged defect.141 He went on to say that there would have been no 
complaint had the tribunal accepted the Respondents suggestion.142
2. Estoppel
The C.F.I. similarly found that Intermediate Court’s decision did not 
constitute estoppel because in applying the public policy exception, the 
enforcing court looks to the public policy of its own law, and not the 
supervising jurisdiction’s.143 On the issue of estoppel, Tang agreed with 
the C.F.I ., but also held that more weight should have been accorded to 
the judgment of the Intermediate Court.144 He found that where a super-
visory jurisdiction has refused to set aside an award, and the enforcing 
jurisdiction refuses to enforce it, the result could be highly unjust.145 
The plaintiffs are then deprived of seeking another arbitration and may 
not enforce the present decision.146 A court of Hong Kong is ill-placed 
to decide what constitutes as taking advantage of people in precarious 
positions under PRC law, especially considering there is no analogous 
concept under Hong Kong law, and a Mainland court is better suited to 
make such judgments.147 Correspondingly, the supervising court will be 
in the best position as to what may constitute bias under that law.148 The 
C.A. explained that estoppel would only give way when the supervisory 
courts are limited in their jurisdiction to interfere, or when they will not 
interfere because of corruption.149
3. Apparent Bias & Public Policy
Judge Reynolds held that while a case for actual bias could not be 
made out, one for apparent bias could be.150 The standard for apparent 
bias is whether the circumstances would cause a fair-minded observer to 
apprehend a real risk of bias. Concerning the mediation at the Shangri-la 
Hotel, Judge Reynolds cited several disconcerting facts supporting his 
141  Id. at 649.
142  Id. at 648–49.
143  Gao Haiyan, [2011] H.K.E.C. 514 ¶¶ 92, 93 (C.F.I.).
144  Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.I.R.D. at 645.
145  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 645 (C.A.).
146  Id.
147  Id. at 657.
148  Id.
149  Id. at 645.
150  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2011] H.K.E.C. 514, ¶ 91 (C.F.I.).
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judgment.151 He was concerned that Pan and zhou, instead of acting 
as neutral mediators, acted as advocates.152 To support this contention, 
Judge Reynolds examined the award and found that the total awarded 
was 25% greater than the applicant’s bottom line.153 Furthermore, 
Judge Reynolds found no real calculation of damages for the settlement 
request of 250 million RMB.154 Judge Reynolds held that these facts 
constituted apparent bias.155
Regarding the med-arb process as a whole, Judge Reynolds com-
mented that the Model Law, much of which is imported into the 
Arbitration Ordinance, has safeguards against med-arb. He elaborated 
that med-arb is infected with self-apparent problems regarding bias, 
and the disclosure of sensitive information may be used in the follow-
ing proceedings.156 He further emphasized that many arbitrators will 
decline to act as mediators in the same dispute because they must take 
great pains to eliminate any impression of bias.157
Judge Reynolds then examined whether the public policy exception 
to enforcement applies. Here, there were two competing public policy 
concerns, finality to litigation and the wrongfulness of upholding an 
award tainted by bias.158 Given the recent merger between domestic 
and international arbitration in Hong Kong, he compared this award 
151  Pan never asked for the Respondents’ counsel permission to contact the 
Respondents, and said Respondent’s counsel was not present at the purported 
mediation. The mediation was held in a highly informal venue, and there was a sense of 
pressure on the zeng manifested through the phrase “work on.” He also was concerned 
that there was no evidence that Pan was approved by either party. Id. at ¶¶ 22, 44, 46.
152  Gao Haiyan H.K.E.C. at ¶ 61.
153  The Applicants’ bottom line was RMB 200,000. Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 
627, 658 (C.A.).
154  Gao Haiyan, [2011] H.K.E.C. at ¶ 48.
155  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2011] H.K.E.C. 514, ¶ 91 (C.F.I.).
156  Id. at ¶¶ 71, 72, 75, 76.
157  Id. at ¶ 77.
158  Id. at ¶ 100.
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to domestic standards.159 Under Hong Kong public policy, a domestic 
award tainted with apparent bias is unenforceable, and Judge Reynolds 
reasoned that international awards should receive no more favorability 
than domestic ones.160
The C.A. strongly disagreed. It held that only when enforcing an 
award would violate Hong Kong’s fundamental principles and notions 
of moral justice that an award will be refused under the public policy 
ground. It can only be relied on in exceptional cases, such as corrup-
tion.161 The main question is whether the party’s opportunity to be heard 
by an impartial and independent tribunal is violated and whether that 
party’s rights are prejudiced. The C.A. held such as case had not been 
reached here.162
The point of the New York Convention and the Arrangement is to 
promote enforcement of awards. Refusal of enforcement will typically 
be extraordinary, and enforcement should not be denied on the grounds 
of technical defects in the rules.163 Framing the conduct of mediation in 
such a way, the C.A. allowed for some cultural flexibility and an under-
standing that divergent legal systems will have very different ways of 
looking at things.164 The C.A. was not concerned that zeng, as opposed 
to counsel, was contacted given the circumstances of the case.165 As to 
159  Hong Kong merged the domestic and international regimes in order to simplify 
the administration of arbitration. Here, the CFI imported domestic public policy into 
the context of international agreements. Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2011] 
H.K.E.C. 514, ¶ 100 (C.F.I.).. But see Hebei Import & Export Corp. v. Polytek Eng. 
Co. [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 605, 675 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler 
Plymouth Inc, 473 U.S. 614 (1985), for the proposition that public policy grounds in 
international commercial arbitration are held to a higher standard than purely domestic 
arbitrations).
160  Gao Haiyan, H.K.E.C. at ¶ 101..
161  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 660 (C.A.).
162  Id. at 660.
163  Id. at 646.
164  See id. For example, the decision below partially relied on the absence of 
Respondents’ counsel. Gao Haiyan, H.K.E.C. at ¶ 46. Tang retorted that a Mainland 
Court is better suited to determine the role of a Mainland lawyer, and it is important to 
consider how mediations are typically conducted in the place the contract designates. 
Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 659.
165  He noted that the Respondents had never actually complained it was zeng, and not 
counsel was contacted Moreover, there was a great deal of confusion as to controlled 
the Respondents, and based on zeng’s testimony for the Respondents, he found that 
zeng had authority to negotiate based on his agreement to let two of the Respondents 
to pay more money to settle. Id. at 654.
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the discrepancies in the valuation of the Award, the C.A. noted that it 
was not in a position to comment on its correctness.166
To emphasize his point on cultural flexibility, he noted that while 
some may be concerned by the informal manner of the mediation, 
whether the court should treat such informality with judicial hostility 
depends on how mediations are normally conducted in the place desig-
nated by the arbitration agreement, introducing a cultural sliding scale 
by which awards are examined under the public policy exception.167
III. Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings in Context
While the C.A. did not elaborate, it found that a case of waiver had 
been made out.168 In comparison to previous case law, this ruling rein-
forces the presumption that if an issue concerning the impartiality of an 
arbitrator or a procedural defect arises during the course of the proceed-
ings and is not objected to, that defense is waived. Hebei Import and 
Export Co. is distinguishable from Gao Haiyan in this regard. While 
both address the proprietary of an arbitrator’s conduct, in Hebei Import 
and Export Co., the applicants did not rely on the breach of “fundamen-
tal notions of morality and justice” or a public policy ground before 
the Beijing Intermediate Court.169 Therefore, taking Hebei Import and 
Export Co.and Gao Haiyan together, the immediate effect of the hold-
ing in Gao Haiyan with regards to waiver, is to stress that waiver can be 
made by not raising an issue before the supervising jurisdiction, or the 
arbitral tribunal.
Other cases illustrate the importance of waiver when seeking 
enforcement on public policy grounds in Hong Kong. For example, in 
Xiamen Xinjingdi, the respondents’ waiver played a role in the denial of 
their claim. While the respondents did not go before the Intermediate 
Court in that case, the fact that they could have raised their claim in 
166  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 657 (C.A.). The 
C.A. also noted that people connected to the Respondents were in fact trying to raise 
R.M.B. 250,000,000 when the Award was made reinforcing its validity. Id. See also A 
v. R [2009] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 389, 397 (C.F.I.)(granting enforcement where a liquidated
damages provision was not litigated before the arbitral tribunal).
167  Gao Haiyan, 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 659
168  Id. at 645.
169  Hebei Import and Export Corp. v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 665, 669 
(C.F.I.).
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either the first or second arbitration was central to the case’s holding.170 
Practitioners must also be aware of the necessity to raise the complaint 
formally before the tribunal, as simply unilaterally complaining to a 
single arbitrator will not suffice.171 It is necessary to make an effort to 
exhaust local remedies to the fullest extent possible.172 However, with 
the use of waiver, not all factual defenses are treated equally. It remains 
an open question whether a party can waive a defense based on the 
illegality of a contract.173
An issue analogous to waiver is the weight put on the supervising 
jurisdiction’s decision, at instant the intermediate courts. A party is faced 
with two choices when a Mainland award is granted against it. They 
may simply wait and resist the award at enforcement, risking waiver for 
not exhausting local remedies and keeping defenses “up the sleeve,”174 
or raise the issue before the Intermediate Court and risk estoppel by that 
court.175 The primary concern is whether the arguments were withheld 
in good faith, or whether it is a tactical decision to delay the applicant 
from enjoying the fruits of the award.176 Under Hong Kong public 
policy, there is a very strong public policy consideration for upholding 
the decisions of supervising jurisdictions. This is primarily to reinforce 
principles of comity,177 and ensure that plaintiffs are not barred from 
170  Compare Xiamen Xinjingdi Grp. Ltd., [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 353, 360 (C.A.), with 
Pacific China Holdings Ltd. v. Grand Pacific Holdings Ltd, [2007] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 741 
(C.F.I.) (refusing enforcement where the applicants’ did not complain of unilateral 
communications between an arbitrator and the respondents). See also A v. R [2009] 3 
H.K.L.R.D. 389, 397 (C.F.I.) (holding where a party does not complain about liquidated 
damages before the arbitral tribunal, those damages are presumed reasonable).
171  China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch, [1995] 2 H.K.L.R. at 
217, 223 (H.C.).
172  See id.
173  Shandong Textiles Import and Export Corp. v. Da Hua Non-Ferrous Metals Co., 
[2002] H.K.F.C. 844, 852 (C.F.I.).
174  Hebei Import and Export v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 665, 688 
(C.F.I.). See also, Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd., [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 358. See also, 
China Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch, [1995] 2 H.K.L.R. 215 at 
223, 224 (H.C.) (enforcing a CIETAC award because the defendants did not exhaust 
local remedies, and would not have complained if they had won).
175  See Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627 (C.F.I.).
176  Hebei Import and Export, H.K.L.R.D. at 690.
177  A v. R [2009] 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 393.
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relief by being unable to reconvene an arbitration or enforce the current 
award.178
Gao Haiyan reinforces these policy considerations. The C.A. 
expressly stated that it felt the C.F.I. did not accord proper weight to the 
decision of the Intermediate Court,179 and that by refusing enforcement 
substantial injustice could ensue.180 The C.A. and Hong Kong courts 
generally tend to value the decision of the supervising jurisdiction unless 
an extreme case arises. For example, in Shantou Seng Ping Xu Yueli Shu 
Kuao Trading Co. v. Wescro Polymers Ltd. the respondents attacked an 
award on the basis of an illegal contract.181 The Beijing Intermediate 
Court rejected this argument, and the C.F.I. held that it would enforce 
the award as a matter of comity.182
The C.A. reinforced these principles, but this should not deter par-
ties from applying for relief in the intermediate courts of China. There 
are cases where the supervising jurisdiction’s decision will be granted 
significantly less weight, particularly in cases where fraud or corrup-
tion are used to procure an award.183 Furthermore, some public policy 
defenses are not subject to estoppel defenses. Hong Kong courts will 
not ignore actual bias,184 as opposed to the appearance of bias in the 
principal case.185 However, claims based simply on factual disputes will 
not trigger the public policy exception.186 Also, depending on the nature 
of the contract, contracts which are unenforceable often preclude the 
178  Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 645.
179  Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 650.
180  Id. See also Shanghai City Foundation Works Corp. v. Sunlink Ltd., [2001] 
H.C.C.T. no. 83 of 200 (H.C.).
181  Shantou Seng Ping Xu Yueli Shu Kuao Trading Co. v. Wescro Polymers Ltd., [2002] 
H.K.E.C. 76, ¶ 14 (C.F.I.).
182  Id. at ¶ 17. See also, Kunming Factory of Prestressed Vibrohydropressed Concrete 
Pipe v. True Stand Investments, [2006] H.K.E.C. 2267, ¶ 13 (C.F.I.) (enforcing an 
award where the Beijing Intermediate Court had ruled against the Respondents on an 
issue of the procedure used to constitute the arbitral body).
183  Shandong Textiles Import and Export Corp. v. Da Hua Non-Ferrous Metals 
Co., [2002] H.K.F.C. 844, 860 (C.F.I.). See also, JJ Agro Industries Ltd. v. Texuna 
Ineternational Ltd., [1994] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 89 (C.F.I.) (kidnapping of a witness held to 
be fraud and contrary to public policy).
184  Hebei Import and Export v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] H.K.L.R.D. 665, 676 
(C.F.I.).
185  Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 660.
186  Shantou Seng Ping Xu Yueli Shu Kuao Trading Co. [2002] H.K.E.C. at ¶ 18.
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estoppel defense.187 A failure to raise a public policy ground will not fail 
for estoppel where the public policy of the enforcing and supervisory 
jurisdictions are so disparate that the defense being asserted was not 
available at the supervisory jurisdiction.188
The instant case does not change these principles. The breach 
described was never raised at the arbitral tribunal, and because the C.A. 
found that the Respondents were effectively holding an argument up 
their sleeve on a possible technical breach of the rules, the claim failed.189 
The Respondents claim did not rise to the level of fraud, corruption, or 
a failure to present their case. In fact, the Respondents emphasized they 
were not even complaining of actual bias, but apparent bias.190 These 
sorts of technical violations are the exact sort that the narrow construc-
tion of the public policy exception seeks to avoid.
The C.A. held that an appearance of bias cannot give rise to a public 
policy claim, but rather that actual bias was required.191 Apparent bias is 
established if the fair-minded observer would have a real apprehension 
that an arbitrator may favor a party. It is a lower bar than required for 
actual bias, though if the case for apparent bias is strong enough, it can 
lead to an inference of actual bias.192 When confronted with a proce-
dural breach that may give rise to apparent bias in Hong Kong courts, a 
party must assert that claim before the tribunal in order to have a chance 
of substantiating it and succeeding on an inference of actual basis in 
enforcement actions before Hong Kong courts. Furthermore, in cases 
that involve the potential impropriety of an arbitrator, this must result in 
actually prejudicing the respondents’ case.193 Gao Haiyan emphasizes 
this point, even if indirectly. Nothing in the Respondents’ argument 
claimed that Pan’s conduct amounted to actual bias, which was a strong 
187  Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co., [2005] 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 735 
(holding a mediation and concilliation clause’s ambiguity rendered the whole contract 
unenforceable). But see Shantou Seng Ping Xu Yueli Shu Kuao Trading Co. v. Wesco 
Polymers Ltd., [2002] H.K.E.C. 76 (C.F.I.) (holding that an allegedly illegal contract 
for incapacity could be enforced because the issue had not been raised at the tribunal, 
and the issue was merely a dispute of fact).
188  See Hebei Import and Export v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 665, 688 
(C.F.I.).
189  Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 645, 660 (C.F.I).
190  Id. at 660.
191  Id.
192  Id. at 661.
193  Qinhuangdao Tongda Enterprise Development Corp. v. Million Basic Co., [1993] 
1 H.K.L.R. 173, 176–77 (C.F.I.).
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consideration in the C.A. decision.194 Practitioners who wish to rely on 
the misconduct of the arbitrator therefore must specifically demonstrate 
how the communications, or here the mediation, actually prejudiced 
them. This is largely to avoid allowing abuse of process.195
As previously discussed, the public policy exception is narrow in 
Hong Kong, and where a court can rely on another ground to deny 
enforcement, such as failure to present a case, the court will do so.196 
Preclusion from presenting a case is a common alternative ground in 
cases involving the arbitrators’ impropriety. This ground is available 
both under PRC law197 and Hong Kong law.198 However, relying on this 
ground is very sensitive to whether whatever violation alleged to take 
place is objected to at the tribunal,199 and whether this alleged breach 
was determinative in some way of the outcome.200 Cases of extreme 
deprivation of due process, such as being denied the opportunity to 
cross examine a witness or challenge evidence, will also trigger a denial 
of enforcement without regard to waiver or estoppel.201 In the principal 
case, this ground was not relied on, but rather the Respondents chose 
to rely on the public policy exception exclusively. However, it should 
be noted this is likely because of their failure to object at the tribunal. 
This alternate ground of relief should provide some comfort to those 
advocating a broader public policy exception.
Hong Kong has a strong public policy emphasis on the finality to 
litigation, and like other leading jurisdictions narrowly construes the 
public policy exception. Here, there were strong interests in comity 
194  See Gao Haiyan v. Keeneye Holdings Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 627, 659 (C.A.). 
195  See, e.g., A v. R [2009] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 389, 397 (C.F.I.) (where the court found that 
Respondents committed an abuse of process because they did not raise the liquidated 
damages isues before the arbitral tribunal).
196  See Paklito Investment Ltd. v. Klockner East Asia Ltd., [1993] 12 H.K.L.R. 39, 49 
(H.C.).
197  The Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Jan. 01, 2000) Art. 70, 
71.
198  Arbitration Ordinance, (2011) Cap. 609 § 95(2)(c)(ii).
199  See Xiamen Xinjingdi Group Ltd., [2009] 4 H.K.L.R.D. at 360. See also, China 
Nanhai Oil Joint Service Corp. Shenzhen Branch, [1995] 2 H.K.L.R. at 226; A v. R 
[2009] 3 H.K.L.R.D. at 397.
200  Shandong Textiles Import and Export Corp., [2002] H.K.F.C. at 854 (holding that 
an expert report did not put the defendant at a disadvantage, and errors of procedure 
do not necessarily give rise to a failure to present a case).
201  Paklito Investment Ltd., [1993] 12 H.K.L.R. at 49.
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at issue. If the C.A. had refused enforcement on the basis of apparent 
bias, where the Respondents agreed there were no allegations of actual 
bias,202 the decision would have opened wide avenues of attack on 
Chinese arbitral and civil judgments. Mediation is tightly intertwined 
with the entire Chinese judicial process, and as the Mainland’s economy 
grows, there will be more and more cases that will involve med-arb 
procedures conducted in China. It is not in Hong Kong’s public policy 
interests to offer such a wide range of attack. In fact, considering the 
pervasiveness of mediation in Sinic culture, a contrary decision would 
have undermined the pro-enforcement bias of both the Convention and 
the Arrangement.
Parties are not without recourse if they are unwilling to mediate in 
China. First, in the principal case it seems there was at least an indi-
cation that the parties assented to a mediation.203 And while party’s at 
times may find themselves unwilling participants in mediations, the 
new CIETAC rules allow for severing the mediation and arbitration 
processes.204 While Chinese parties will press for CIETAC arbitration, 
foreign parties now may apply for the use of other arbitral rules, such 
as UNICTRAL or the rules of the ICC in CIETAC arbitrations.205 These 
safeguards, along with careful drafting, should allow a party to mitigate 
the negative effects of mediation procedures in the PRC.
The decision of the C.A. given Hong Kong’s cultural and legal tra-
ditions, and political situation, is understandable. However, it presents 
several difficulties for businesses by precluding apparent bias under 
the public policy exception, and more importantly, introducing cultural 
considerations to the roles of fiduciaries, such as lawyers and agents, 
and the context of a mediation. The concept of guanxi and the incon-
sistency of CIETAC, the arbitral tribunal authorized to resolve foreign 
related disputes, provide serious challenges.
Corruption in the Chinese judicial system is well documented, 
and a source of frustration for many businesses.206 Arbitration through 
CIETAC is the primary dispute resolution mechanism employed when 
202  Gao Haiyan, [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. at 107.
203  Gao Haiyan, [2011] H.K.E.C. at ¶ 18.
204  Song, supra note 35, 311.
205  CIETAC Rules Article 4 (3).
206  Terrence F. McaLaren, Eckstrom’s Licensing in Foreign and Domestic Operations, 
§ 11:11 Dispute Settlement-overview, Part II: Business Environment for Joint Ventures
in Selected Countries, China. (Thomson Reuters 2012).
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a dispute concerns a foreign related matter or foreign party.207 However, 
many investors have found arbitration through CIETAC to be unreli-
able and inconsistent.208 Given that many of the mediations conducted 
through CIETAC are conducted by the very same arbitrators who pre-
side over the tribunals, the same issues regarding consistency and cor-
ruption arise. Exacerbating the issue is the Chinese cultural concept of 
guanxi, defined as a process by which an individual may assist another 
in the resolution of a problem in exchange for further assistance, which 
is particularly influential in business.209 It plays a prominent role in state 
level corruption, particularly considering China’s political structure 
which was “rule by men instead of rule be law[.]”210 Guanxi acts as 
the principle which marries money and power in state organs.211 This 
guanxi driven corruption extends to the judicial system.212 Gao Haiyan’s 
elimination of apparent bias as a grounds for refusal under the public 
policy doctrine, while understandable given Hong Kong’s cultural and 
political position in the world, presents a serious problem for foreigners 
doing business in China. Whereas apparent bias is determined from an 
objective perspective, actual bias requires a higher threshold. Because 
of guanxi’s forward looking design of trading benefits, it may be much 
more difficult to detect and prove in court.213 While these obstacles are 
not insurmountable, they are significant. The best safeguard against 
them when seeking to resist or potentially enforce an Mainland Chinese 
award in Hong Kong is careful contract drafting.
The Arbitration Law of China provides for optional concili-
ation.214 Conforming with these provisions, CIETAC Rules provide that 
207  Id.
208  Id.
209  Ying Fan, Guanxi’s Consequences: Personal Gains at Social Cost, 38 No. 4 J. 
bus. eThiCs 371, 372, 374 (2002).
210  Id. at 376.
211  Id. at 377.
212  Id at 378. 
213  The standard for a finding of actual bias has never been clearly enunciated by the 
Hong Kong courts. Hebei Import and Export Corp. held that “[a]ctual bias would be 
more than our courts could overlook even where the award concerned is a convention 
award.” Hebei Import and Export Corp. v. Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 
665,676 (C.F.I. 1999) (distinguishing apparent bias and actual bias).
214  zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhongcaifa ( ) [The 
Arbitration Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Jan. 01, 1995) art. 58.
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conciliation may be provided by the arbitral tribunal,215 but if the parties 
elect to have the dispute mediated outside of the tribunal, “CIETAC 
may, with the consent of both parties, assist the parties to conciliate the 
dispute in a manner and procedure it considers appropriate (emphasis 
added).”216 Chinese laws are intentionally drafted with broad language 
in order to encourage varying interpretations, and the emphasized lan-
guage provides little comfort to those who wish to engage in mediation 
through CIETAC while sanitizing the process of potential corruption, 
apparent bias, and estoppel issues. There is another option. CIETAC 
recently changed its rules and provides that:
Where the parties agree to refer their dispute to CIETAC 
for arbitration but have agreed on a modification of these 
Rules or have agreed on the application of other arbi-
tration rules, the parties’ agreement shall prevail unless 
such agreement is inoperative or in conflict with a man-
datory provision of the law as it applies to the arbitration 
proceedings. Where the parties have agreed on the appli-
cation of other arbitration rules, CIETAC shall perform 
the relevant administrative duties.217
This is a major advantage. It allows for the parties to functionally 
abrogate Article 45(8) and replace it with a more stringent procedure. 
For example, the parties could agree to terms which set out strict time-
tables, incorporate ICC Rules or UNICTRAL Rules, and nominate in 
advance members of CIETAC’s Panel of Arbitrators. While the negotia-
tion cost may be an issue, this would eliminate the risk of apparent bias 
by walling off the arbitrators in the tribunal. Furthermore, a contractual 
provision providing for the use of HKIAC Rules as interpreted by Hong 
Kong courts, as consistent with the Chinese Arbitration Law, may reduce 
the risk of estoppel. Regardless of any contractual provision included, 
it is important that the interested party does not waive its rights through 
its actions or express waiver. This provides protection against estoppel, 
not waiver.
215  China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration 
Rules (revised and adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce, Feb. 3, 201, effective May 1, 2012) 
art. 45(1).
216  Id. at art. 45(8).
217  Id. at art. 4(3).
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Should a nominated arbitrator be unavailable, there is additional 
recourse. CIETAC provides an abundant source of foreign arbitrators. 
The Arbitration Law of China requires that arbitration commissions use 
arbitrators from its Panel of Arbitrators, which consists of 998 arbitra-
tors. 44 are from Hong Kong, and 218 are foreign arbitrators.218 In order 
to qualify as an approved arbitrator the prospective candidate must meet 
one of several conditions.219 But when a paneled arbitrator is unavail-
able to serve as a mediator, CIETAC Rules allow for the nomination 
of arbitrators to serve as mediators who are not on CIETAC’s Panel of 
Arbitrators.220 The selected prospective mediators would still have to 
conform with the mandatory requirements of Article 15 of the China 
Arbitration Law.
There is one final avenue to ensure protection, and its utilization 
depends on the negotiating strengths of the respective parties. CIETAC 
Rules provide:
Where the parties have agreed on the place of the arbitra-
tion, the parties’ agreement shall prevail, [but] [w]here 
the parties have not agreed on the place of arbitration 
or their agreement is ambiguous, the place of arbitration 
shall be the domicile of CIETAC or its sub-comissioner 
[or] center administrating the case. CIETAC may also 
determine the place of arbitration to be another location 
having regard to the circumstances of the case.
This would allow for a CIETAC administered arbitration to take 
place in Hong Kong. This would presumably subject CIETAC arbitra-
tions to the supervising jurisdiction’s mandatory law, in Hong Kong 
218  CIETAC Implements New Panel of Arbitrators, CIETAC.org, http://www.cietac.
org/index/news/477265d85773bc7f001.cms (last visited March 27 2013).
219  The proposed arbitrator must have “been engaged in arbitration work for at least 
eight years, worked as a lawyer for at least eight years, served as a judge for at least 
eight years, have been engaged in legal research or legal education, possessing a senior 
professional title, or to have acquired the knowledge aw, engaged in the professional 
work in the field of economy and trade, etc., possessing a senior professional title or 
having an equivalent professional title.” (internal punctuation omitted). The Arbitration 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 1994, effective Jan. 01, 1995) art. 13 (1)-(5).
220  China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission Arbitration 
Rules (revised and adopted by the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade/China Chamber of International Commerce, Feb. 3, 201, effective May 1, 2012) 
art. 23(2).
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the Arbitration Ordinance. In the context of a med-arb proceeding, the 
Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance provides significant safeguards. If 
an arbitrator is to act as a mediator, the parties must consent to such 
a proceeding in writing.221 Moreover, if an arbitrator gains access to 
confidential information and no settlement is reached, the arbitrator 
must “disclose to all other parties as much of that information as the 
arbitrator considers is material to the arbitration proceedings.”222 Lastly, 
the prospective award would be subject to confirmation in the courts of 
Hong Kong.
ConClusion
Although med-arb proceedings have inherent problems, the CA’s 
decision reflected cultural and political realities. If the CA had opened 
the scope of attack in the context of med-arb, because of the role media-
tion plays in the PRC, this would prejudice a large number of awards and 
decisions rendered in the PRC. Given Hong Kong’s narrow interpreta-
tion of the public policy exception, and its close cultural and historical 
relationship with the PRC, this was the most sensible decision in the 
case. To buttress the potential pitfalls of this decision, foreign parties 
should expend more in negotiating process in order to ensure a fair and 
impartial resolution of their potential disputes through contract drafting 
which takes advantage of CIETAC’s rules and the local arbitration laws 
of China and Hong Kong.
221  Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance, Cap. 609, (2011) § 33 (1).
222  Id. at § 33 (4).
